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NO. 11 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
Nile Conflict: Compensation 
Rather Than Mediation 
How Europeans Can Lead an Alternative Way Forward 
Tobias von Lossow, Luca Miehe and Stephan Roll 
The conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the distribution and use of the Nile 
water has entered a new phase. Questions about how and over what period of time 
the reservoir of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will be filled are taking 
centre stage. Against this backdrop, the USA launched a new mediation attempt at 
the end of 2019. However, initial hopes of a swift agreement have not materialized. 
The longer substantial results are postponed, the more apparent it becomes that ex-
ternal mediation alone will not suffice to resolve the dispute. In order to defuse the 
conflict, it might be necessary for Egypt to compensate Ethiopia for concessions on 
the GERD. Germany and its European partners should provide Egypt with financial 
support for creating a compensation mechanism. This would promote stability in 
Europe’s conflict-ridden neighbouring region, and reduce migration pressure. But 
Europeans should tie financial contributions to clear conditions vis-à-vis Cairo, aimed 
at improving water management and overall governance. 
 
The negotiations on the Nile water conflict, 
mediated by the US administration, had to 
be adjourned once more at the end of Feb-
ruary. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan were 
again unable to agree on a joint and com-
prehensive approach to the filling of the 
GERD reservoir. US Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo has indicated that it could be 
months before an agreement is reached. 
Since three rounds of negotiations in 
Washington have already failed to produce 
any tangible results, a complete failure 
of the US initiative cannot be ruled out. In 
this situation, Article 10 of the trilateral 
Declaration of Principles of 2015 would be 
activated, which stipulates that further 
consultations should take place, that in-
ternational mediation should be jointly 
initiated, or that negotiations should be 
conducted at the level of heads of state or 
government. 
The lack of success of the Trump admin-
istration’s mediation efforts makes it clear 
once again that the conflict over the use of 
Nile water has reached a dead end. Whereas 
numerous negotiations in recent decades 
have focused on the fundamental question 
of water use rights, Egypt and Ethiopia are 
currently arguing above all about the time-
frame in which the GERD reservoir is ex-
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pected to be filled from 2020 onwards. The 
Egyptian government is insisting on a slow 
fill of 12 to 21 years in order to avoid major 
bottlenecks in the water supply. The Ethio-
pian government, on the other hand, wants 
to fill within 6 years in order to be able to 
reach full capacity for its power generation 
more quickly. Sudan is geographically 
located between the two parties and also in-
volved in the negotiations, but takes a large-
ly neutral position: together with Egypt, 
Khartoum is benefiting from the existing 
water distribution scheme and at the same 
time anticipates benefits from GERD. A fur-
ther loss of time will in any case weaken 
the Egyptian negotiating position. 
Egypt under Pressure 
Egypt relies almost entirely on the Nile for 
its water needs, providing over 90 percent 
of the nation’s water resources.  Approxi-
mately 86 percent of the Nile water that 
reaches the Aswan Dam originates in the 
Ethiopian highlands. However, Ethiopia has 
so far been unable to take advantage of its 
favourable geostrategic position as an up-
stream riparian state. In the past, a lack of 
financial resources and an unstable politi-
cal situation prevented the expansion of 
the water infrastructure in Ethiopia. 
In light of this, successive governments 
in Cairo have always insisted on the status 
quo of water distribution. In doing so, they 
relied primarily on colonial treaties: firstly, 
an agreement of 1929 with the colonial 
power Great Britain, which granted Egypt 
a veto right against water projects on the 
upper reaches; and secondly, an agreement 
with Sudan of 1959, which divided the Nile 
water resources between the two countries, 
and guaranteed Egypt 55.5 billion cubic 
metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion 
cubic metres. Cairo ignores the fact that 
these contracts were negotiated without 
Ethiopia. 
The construction of the GERD has fun-
damentally changed the balance of power 
on the Nile. Adherence to the old water 
contracts no longer offers Egypt any protec-
tion against restrictions on its own water 
supply. Recurrent threats from Cairo to stop 
the dam construction project by military 
means if necessary are rather improbable, 
not least because of the distance between 
the two countries. To date, efforts to exert 
pressure on Ethiopia via the mobilisation 
of allied states have also been unsuccessful. 
The USA and the Europeans, but also the 
Gulf States and the People’s Republic of 
China, maintain good relations with both 
countries; they are evidently unwilling to 
take sides in the water conflict. 
It is unlikely that the Ethiopian leader-
ship will compromise on its own initiative, 
given the national dimension of the project. 
At the end of 2019, about 70 percent of the 
construction work had been completed, 
such that filling can begin in 2020 and full 
operation seems viable – depending on the 
filling timeframe – in 2025. Currently, a 
large section of the Ethiopian population 
has no access to electricity. The construc-
tion of the GERD is therefore of similar 
importance to Ethiopia as the Aswan Dam 
was for Egypt: it is not just an infrastruc-
ture project, but a project of the century, 
which should pave the way for the moderni-
sation of the country. Further delays in its 
implementation, or a drastic reduction in 
the size of the project, can hardly be justi-
fied by the Ethiopian government to its own 
population. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s 
visit to the GERD on 1 February 2020 was 
highly symbolic, just one day after another 
round of fruitless negotiations. 
Negotiations on the filling of the reser-
voir are at an impasse – but with clear 
advantages for Ethiopia. In the event of 
new delays, the government in Addis Ababa 
could initiate a rapid filling, which could 
cause a dramatic water shortage in Egypt, 
and perhaps even impact on energy pro-
duction (see Map). In order to avert such a 
scenario, the European states in particular 
could offer an alternative approach. After 
all, Egypt’s security of supply and Ethiopia’s 
development are central to the stability of 
the entire region, home to over 250 million 
people. A lack of development opportuni-
ties and water shortages could have serious 
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consequences for Europe, including increas-
ing migration pressure. If no agreement can 
be reached, Germany and its European part-
ners should offer alternative solutions to 
revitalise the negotiations. 
A Compensation Mechanism 
A renewed attempt to resolve the Nile water 
conflict by external actors can no longer be 
limited to facilitating negotiations between 
the conflict parties. This approach has proven 
ineffective, not only because the Trump 
administration’s initiative has so far failed 
to make a breakthrough. The Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI), which was created in 1999 
and is supported to a large extent by Euro-
pean countries, has also not been particu-
larly successful. Its objective was to bring 
the Nile riparians around the negotiating 
table and, in parallel, to promote technical 
cooperation on the use of resources. The 
political and legal issues of water distribu-
tion and use remained unresolved despite 
the NBI. In the current stalemate, Euro-
peans should present their own proposal 
that fundamentally recognises Ethiopia’s 
increased negotiating power. Unlike in the 
past, negotiations under European leader-
ship should not concentrate on distribution 
quotas, but on how and in what form Egypt 
can alleviate the negative consequences for 
Ethiopia of the slow filling of the reservoir. 
One option would be to develop a com-
pensation mechanism between the two 
countries. It would need to stipulate that 
Egypt compensates Ethiopia for the eco-
nomic disadvantages resulting from a 
slower filling process. The basis for calcu-
lating the opportunity costs that Ethiopia 
would incur could be twofold: the financial 
value of the electricity Ethiopia was not 
able to generate and its corresponding eco-
nomic benefits. Since the data situation 
is ambiguous, the determination of these 
opportunity costs could not be a purely 
technical process, but ultimately the result 
Map 
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of political negotiations, which could be 
guided by Germany and its European part-
ners. Furthermore, the Gulf monarchies, 
as the most important partners of the three 
Nile states affected, should be included in 
the negotiations. They would benefit from 
peaceful and sustainable conflict resolu-
tion, since they have invested heavily in the 
Nile basin, especially in the agricultural 
sector. 
In view of possible climate variability, 
such a mechanism would offer flexibility 
in filling the reservoir. In rainy years, Ethio-
pia could retain more water than initially 
agreed, which would reduce compensation 
payments. Conversely, the mechanism could 
be used to compensate the country in peri-
ods of drought if it passed on more water 
to Egypt than originally agreed. If such a 
compensation mechanism for the filling 
phase could be worked out, the rules and 
principles could also be used in the future 
to control the water volume at the dam. 
The financing of such a mechanism 
would have to be provided by Egypt. Al-
though under international law the country 
is entitled to an equitable and fair share 
of the Nile waters, a quota system in accord-
ance with Egypt’s position would be vir-
tually impossible to implement in law 
and in practice. Due to the state’s drained 
finances, Cairo is hardly in a position to 
finance such a mechanism on its own – 
the Europeans would have to get involved. 
The Conditions for 
European Engagement 
The Europeans should, however, make 
their contributions to such a compensation 
mechanism, and thus their support for 
Egypt, subject to conditions aimed at a com-
prehensive solution to the water crisis. The 
conflict over the GERD and the use of the 
Nile waters is already taking place in the 
context of an acute water emergency in 
Egypt (see Map). Even without filling the 
GERD reservoir, the country will reach 
the threshold of absolute water scarcity in 
2025, according to United Nations (UN) 
estimates. Considerable population growth 
is contributing to this, as is mismanage-
ment in the water sector and the misallo-
cation of public funds. Yet Egypt under 
President Sisi has become  the world’s third 
largest importer of weapons and is pushing 
ahead with resource-intensive prestige proj-
ects – such as a new capital in the desert 
(at least $45 billion) or the construction of 
a nuclear power plant (approx. $25 billion); 
meanwhile government investment in water 
management has been neglected. Major sea-
water desalination projects, for example, 
did not begin to take shape until 2017. 
Thus Germany and its European part-
ners should tie their financial contributions 
within the framework of the compensation 
solution to the following conditions. They 
would have to demand a reorientation of 
Egypt’s state spending policy, which should 
no longer be oriented towards authoritarian 
logic. To achieve such a reorientation, polit-
ical reforms towards better governance 
and accountability would be indispensable. 
Ethiopia would have to commit itself to re-
acting flexibly in the case of extreme 
droughts during the mutually agreed time-
frame of filling the reservoir. 
Tobias von Lossow is Research Fellow at Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations. 
Luca Miehe is Research Assistant at the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
Dr Stephan Roll is Head of the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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